As a continuation of the analysis of the fundamental differences between American pragmatic sovereignism and European ideological uniformism in energy policymaking, this article dives deep into the territory of concrete numbers and system physics within the United States of America and Europe.

The electrical energy production mix of a sovereign nation in Europe, or a federal state in the US, is never, nor must it ever be, a wishlist of beautiful political desires and administrative decrees issued in the sterile offices of a centralized bureaucracy. In its engineering essence, it is a direct and inexorable function of two key parameters: the geographical availability of resources and the macroeconomic architecture of the economy, set upon a geopolitically wise foundation.

The Sovereign Establishment of Production Mixes by US States

Through official data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), we will analyze how energy intensity and GDP structure naturally dictate the production mixes of federal states. We will show why the American model, which allows for fluid adaptation to local conditions, is techno-economically superior, and why forcing unification represents a direct attack on the economic survival of industrial nations.

Energy Intensity: The Engineering ID Card of an Economy

To understand why states have radically different electrical energy systems, we must introduce the concept of energy intensity (expressed in thousands of Btu per dollar of generated GDP). This parameter tells us precisely how much energy needs to be injected into an economic organism to generate one unit of economic value.

While the average value at the US national level hovers around 5,000 to 6,000 Btu per dollar of GDP, the differences between individual states are staggering—they vary by up to eight times! It is precisely this difference that explains why „energy uniformity“ is the most dangerous illusion of the modern era. An economy that lives off mining, steel smelting, or heavy chemical industries requires a constant, cheap, and uninterrupted baseload shield. An economy based on financial services, intellectual property, or tourism can afford the luxury of variability and a high price per megawatt-hour.

The Geographical Anatomy of the American Energy System

To clearly illustrate this engineering reality, let us look at the spatial distribution of energy intensity and dominant sources through a map and a comparative overview of key states representing different economic architectures. A clear pattern emerges: the more an economy is tied to primary production and resources, the higher its BTU index is, and the more pronounced its reliance on stable baseload production becomes.

Likewise, in states where the construction of data centers is prominent, there is a clear trend toward strong baseload production, as only such a robust base can power these facilities with an exceptionally high availability of 99.999% of the time—the so-called „five nines.“ On the other hand, states with specific geographical blessings (the plains of the Midwest, the deserts of the Southwest) maximize their use of wind and solar, but always in strict dependence on local economic calculations and, again, the presence or absence of data centers.

Wyoming and Louisiana: The Triumph of Heavy Industry and the Resource Shield

At the very top of the energy intensity scale in America sits Wyoming, with a radical 23,000 Btu per dollar of GDP. The economic architecture of this state is brutally material: it rests on mining, oil and gas exploitation, and supporting heavy industry. Wyoming cannot survive on fluctuating energy. Therefore, its production mix is a harsh reflection of its economy—coal still covers over 70% of generation, providing a cheap and stable base for the most energy-intensive operations, while the remainder is smartly balanced through high-class wind farms across its vast expanses.

A similar, yet more extreme example of economic dependence on the physics of resources is Louisiana (around 19,000 Btu/$ of GDP). Louisiana’s economy is inextricably linked to massive petrochemical manufacturing, oil refining, and the port infrastructure of the Gulf of Mexico. This economy requires a massive quantum of thermal and electrical energy per second, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Because it sits on gigantic gas reservoirs, Louisiana has anchored its generation mix almost entirely (over 70%) on highly efficient gas-fired power plants, while nuclear energy provides an additional stable, carbon-free foundation.

Attempting to impose California’s transition model on Louisiana or Wyoming overnight would mean an immediate shutdown of their industrial engines and an economic collapse of epic proportions. These states have fully aligned their production mixes with their specific geographical and resource capacities, as well as the clear needs of their highly energy-intensive economic architecture and GDP structure.

New York and Massachusetts: The „Green“ Luxury of a Service Economy

On the opposite end of the spectrum are states like New York and Massachusetts, whose energy intensity barely exceeds 2,500 Btu per dollar of GDP. Why can these states aggressively shut down fossil-fuel capacities and proclaim 100% decarbonization? The answer lies not in their „environmental enlightenment,“ but in the structure of their GDP.

The economy of New York State is generated on Wall Street, through digital platforms, media, insurance, and legal services. Financial sectors consume electricity to light offices, run air conditioning, and power computers—their energy intensity is minimal. When economic growth does not depend on tons of mined ore or smelted metal, the corporate and political elite can easily absorb the high systemic integration costs of renewable energy sources, the subsidization of offshore wind farms, and expensive import interconnections—meaning a high price of electricity resulting from all of the above. New York and Massachusetts buy their „green agenda“ on the back of a GDP structure that does not require a heavy baseload energy shield. Again, these states have also aligned their production mix with their capabilities and a far less energy-intensive economic architecture—meaning a much lower need for highly reliable, cheap energy. Achieving this is not possible with their chosen production mixes, but their economy does not need it either; i.e., they can afford the luxury of significantly more expensive electricity that has lower availability due to the nature of the sources that are more heavily represented here.

Tectonic Shifts: Artificial Intelligence and the Example of Virginia

However, the physics of the system always find a way to refute ideological narratives, and the best proof of this is the latest phenomenon we are observing—the explosive growth of data centers and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure. This technological trend is rapidly altering the economic architecture of the state of Virginia.

Located on the East Coast, Virginia historically had a moderate energy intensity. However, given that it has become the global headquarters for the world’s largest data centers (through which over 70% of global internet traffic passes), electricity demand is rising at an unprecedented rate. Tech giants like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are quickly realizing that artificial intelligence algorithms consume enormous amounts of energy and require a „24/7/365“ supply profile. The physics of AI infrastructure do not tolerate the „duck curve“ or periods without wind and sun.

The result? Virginia, despite its earlier declarative green goals, is today rapidly seeking salvation in extending the lifespans and expanding the capacities of nuclear power plants (such as the North Anna and Surry plants), as well as constructing new, flexible gas turbines. The structure of GDP has digitized, but digitalization has, ironically, shown that behind every virtual „cloud“ there must stand a solid, stable, and tangible baseload generator.

An Engineering Lesson for Europe: Serbia is Not California, Nor Can Poland Be New York

When we map these American lessons onto the European continent, the paradox of Brussels’ policy becomes crystal clear and terrifying. The European Union, through its „Fit for 55“ packages, is attempting to force an identical energy straightjacket onto all member states, consciously ignoring, first and foremost, their structural energy intensity and economic architecture, but also their geographical and resource capabilities.

Asking Poland or Serbia—whose economies historically and structurally rest on material production, heavy industry, mining, and raw material processing (making them macroeconomically closer to Wyoming or West Virginia than California and New York)—to transition to a highly variable and high-cost model of renewable sources like the one applied by California or New York within the same deadlines and with the same percentage shares, constitutes a fundamental systemic error.

On the other side, Western European economies—especially those favored by their resource availability, which outsourced their heavy industry off the continent long ago and base their GDP on services—can absorb the financial burden of an expensive transition and system balancing. Developing nations and industrially dependent nations cannot. Imposing this template on resource-dependent countries directly erodes their industrial competitiveness, makes vital production lines unprofitable, and drives them into conscious economic stagnation.

Energy Intensity in Europe: The Gap Between Theory and Reality

The European Union finds itself in the midst of the most expensive socio-economic experiment in history—an administratively driven, top-down transition. However, the laws of physics and the macroeconomic architecture of European states do not track Brussels’ political rhetoric. Just like the US, Europe is deeply divided into high-energy-intensity economies that live off baseline industry and manufacturing, and service economies that can afford the luxury of a high share of variable renewables, a reliance on high import levels, and lower system availability and reliability alongside higher electricity prices. Imposing a uniform mold onto this environment does not create an ecological utopia; instead, it creates an energy and economic rift in which the continent’s industrial countries bear a disproportionately large share of the burden.

When looking at European statistical data, the energy intensity of an economy (the amount of energy required to produce one euro of GDP) clearly exposes the continent’s structural anomalies. In this context, Serbia is an economy with an energy intensity that is roughly 3.5 times higher than the European Union average.

Experts often incorrectly interpret this data solely as a sign of technological backwardness and poor energy efficiency. That is only partially true. The fundamental reason lies in economic architecture: Serbia, Poland, and the Czech Republic are manufacturing and industrial bases. Our real economic organism still heavily relies on mining, heavy industry, the metals sector, and the production of rubber, plastics, and building materials. These sectors need a constant, cheap, and stable baseline energy shield, not a variable megawatt-hour that depends on weather conditions or significant imports.

The Geographical and Economic Anatomy of the European System

To clearly illustrate this engineering reality, let us look at the spatial distribution of energy intensity and dominant sources through a map and a comparative overview of key European states representing different economic models:

The Nominal GDP Trap: Why IT and Services Cannot Drive the Laws of Physics

Critics of energy sovereignism frequently point to statistics showing that the service sector in Serbia captures by far the largest share of the economy, at nearly 58%, while the IT sector itself (information and communications) is recording skyrocketing growth and officially participates with over 8.5% in GDP formation. Based on these figures, they easily suggest that we no longer need a heavy industrial-energy shield and that we can seamlessly transition to modern, fluctuating renewables to a much greater extent because we have „become a digital society.“

This is a fundamental macroeconomic and engineering fallacy. Nominal dollars and euros on the server accounts of IT companies or the highly invoiced value of banking transactions do not drive the laws of physics governing an electrical energy system.

An office with fifty top-tier IT developers can natively create a massive share of GDP through their salaries and software licenses, but its real physical footprint on the electrical grid is minimal—it boils down to a few computers and air conditioning. On the other side, Serbia’s manufacturing industry and metals complex generate a nominally lower percentage of GDP, but they draw the lion’s share, the absolute bulk, of real electrical energy consumption in kilowatt-hours.

Moreover, the largest physical export assets upon which Serbia’s foreign trade balance rests remain the products of basic industry: steel, copper, electrical machinery, rubber, and plastics. This branch of the economy cannot operate on a fluctuating megawatt-hour; if its stable baseline energy becomes too expensive or disappears, the entire economic sustainability of the state breaks down along the chain. Behind every successful piece of software and banking application in Serbia stands a harsh, material infrastructure that demands nothing less than stable and reliable baseload energy, 24 hours a day. We cannot buy our energy sovereignty on a digital exchange if we first jeopardize our own electrical energy base. If we add planned and existing data centers to this mix, the need for an increased share of stable baseload capacities with high availability and a lower megawatt-hour price becomes even stronger.

Three European Models: From Harsh Realism to Green Luxury

Serbia and Poland (Resource-Industrial Realism): These states share an identical engineering destiny. The Polish economy creates value through material production, just like the economy of Serbia. Relying on domestic coal (lignite in Serbia, hard coal in Poland) is not a matter of ideology, but of historical, geographical, and economic reality. When Brussels tries to force Serbia into an accelerated shutdown of thermal power plants through mechanisms like CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism), it directly attacks the competitiveness of the entire domestic industry. Forced and overly rapid decarbonization in countries with this level of energy intensity leads to economic suicide and energy poverty.

France and Norveška (Geographical and Technological Pragmatism): These two states demonstrate how energy sovereignty is defended with resources. Norway, thanks to its unique mountainous geography, gets over 90% of its electricity from free hydropower while simultaneously filling its budget by exporting oil and gas. France, on the other side, made a sovereign decision back in the 1970s via the Messmer Plan to build a nuclear fleet. France’s energy intensity is low because nuclear plants secure a fixed, predictable price for the economy, making France immune to external shocks and gas fluctuations.

Germany (A Lesson on Ideological Collapse): The German model (Energiewende) represents a warning to the entire world. Driven by pure dogmatism, Berlin shut down its technically flawless nuclear power plants and invested hundreds of billions of euros in wind and solar. The result? When a Dunkelflaute occurs (periods with no wind and sun over Central Europe), the industrial heart of Europe is forced to import electricity from French nuclear plants or fire up its own coal capacities and expensive imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). The German automotive and machinery industries, which are highly energy-intensive, are today losing their competitiveness and moving facilities out of Europe because wind and solar cannot provide a stable baseload shield for the economy, and an immense dependence on electricity and gas imports at high prices makes them uncompetitive.

Conclusion: A Lesson for Serbia – Sovereignty Over Decrees

By overlaying geo-economic maps and engineering reality, we arrive at the single sustainable truth: a successful energy policy does not tolerate the administrative terror of uniformity. The American continental model works precisely because it respects the physics and economics of local spaces—allowing Wyoming to defend itself with coal, Louisiana with gas, and Iowa with wind, depending on what feeds their GDP. Brussels’ attempt to simulate a „European energy average“ by decree and forcefully shift nations with an industrial architecture to the consumption profile of financial centers or tourism-fed economies is a techno-economic absurdity that threatens the complete deindustrialization of the continent.

For the electrical energy system of Serbia, and for our entire region, the lesson is clear. We do not have the luxury of California’s innovation budgets or New York’s low energy intensity. Our energy policy must remain deeply sovereign, pragmatic, and faithful to our own economic structure. Europe has every right to strive for synergy, and we must preserve our superb cross-border technical connectivity and grid solidarity as a pillar of stability. However, within that system, the right to define the national production mix must remain an inalienable, sovereign right of each state.

Serbia must play it smart and sovereign. Integration into the European market and technical connectivity through the synchronous zone of Continental Europe are indeed our great engineering advantages that guarantee us stability in moments of crisis. However, the planning of our national production mix must remain strictly in our hands. Transition, yes, but exclusively within deadlines and in a manner dictated by our economy, our resources, and the laws of physics—not administrative decrees from Brussels.

Serbia must develop its own baseload shield—through the modernization of existing capacities, the construction of reversible pumped-storage hydroelectric plants, and the serious consideration, construction, and utilization of nuclear power plants in the near future. Only an energy-sovereign Serbia can be economically strong. Everything else is a conscious stumble into energy dependency.

The future, therefore, lies not in Brussels’ uniformism, but in an alliance of energy-strong, geographically pragmatic, and resource-conscious sovereign systems. This is the only engineering and economic shield that guarantees our survival in a time of major global disruptions.