In the previous analyses of our „How the Great Ones Do It” series, we clearly dismantled the illusion of energy uniformity and proved that a successful power system must remain true to the physics of its own geographical, resource, and macroeconomic space. However, recognizing one’s own resources and industrial needs is only the first step. True sovereignty is not achieved through passive observation of the market, but through the state’s capacity to manage these resources over the long term. While global narratives try to convince us of the omnipotent hand of the deregulated free market, the practice of the world’s most powerful industrial nations shows exactly the opposite: electrical engineering is not a commercial toy, but a foundational infrastructure for national security. In this text, we will demonstrate why rigid central planning—through strictly controlled state quotas and a centralized chain of command—is the only technological and security shield that can save an industrial nation like Serbia from spontaneous collapse and a loss of sovereignty in an era of global energy pressures.
Serbia no longer has the right to indecisiveness in energy matters today. The question of developing the power system is no longer merely a developmental, technical, or regulatory issue. It is a matter of state strength, institutional seriousness, and the capability to protect national security in an area without which neither the economy, public services, nor the daily lives of citizens can function.
Energy as a Question of State Power
Therefore, the fundamental topic facing Serbia is this: does the state possess the tools to truly manage the development of its generation mix, or is it merely adopting indicative strategies that it subsequently lacks the means to enforce? It is precisely in this difference between declarative policy and actual managerial power that the key answer lies, defining the line between future success and failure in this crucial national sector—the energy sector.
The power system is a system that demands continuous, precise, and hierarchically organized state control. Within it, production, consumption, reserves, grid development, the technological structure of capacities, security of supply, and other security-relevant issues must be aligned. In liberal management models, where this harmony is not secured by the state, it is secured by no one.
This is precisely why energy sovereignty is not a political slogan, but the organizational capability of the state to manage every key direction of system development. The state must know what capacities it wants, of what technologies and functionalities, in what order, in what volume, under what technical conditions, and with what effects on the stability of the entire system. If this is not clearly defined and legally operationally binding, then energy policy remains at the level of general intent.
Strategy Without a Mehanism Is Not Enough
Today, Serbia has strategic documents, but it still lacks the most critical component—a mechanism to control the realization of the planned national generation mix. In other words, the state has a direction, but it lacks a sufficiently firm instrument to ensure that this direction is actually implemented. This is a serious institutional flaw.
In energy, having a vision is not enough. It is necessary to have both the state apparatus and the corresponding institutional tools that transform that vision into a sequence of decisions, permits, limitations, priorities, and technical verifications. Without this, planning documents are used merely as a formal framework lacking full executive power. And a state that cannot implement its own energy plan gradually loses control over one of the most important pillars of sovereignty.
Central Planning as a Condition for National Security
The essence of a serious energy policy lies in centralized management. This does not mean an administrative accumulation of procedures, but a clearly established command chain of accountability. Someone must determine a binding development scenario with clearly defined quotas for various types of electricity generation technologies. Someone must verify its technical feasibility. Someone must monitor deviations and react when the system moves away from the planned mix. And most importantly—someone must hold the legal authority to halt whatever is not aligned with the interest of the system, i.e., with the national interests of the state.
The examples of France and China show that such an approach is the standard among serious states.
France’s PPE 3: Strict Control and the Pivot Toward Nuclear
In France, compliance with the planned power mix is not left to retrospective alignment; instead, it is secured through a binding multi-year energy program known as the PPE (Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie). This document is an obligatory operational tool through which the state translates strategy and climate goals into concrete capacities, deadlines, and technological priorities for the coming decade. Its legal authority rests on the Code de l’énergie, and in practice, it means that major energy projects, grid development, and incentive mechanisms must align „letter by letter“ with the predefined state plan and be realized accordingly.
The essence of the French model is that the state plan does not end at the level of goals but goes deep into operational implementation. The PPE specifies developmental pathways by technology, sets caps on installed capacities (quotas by type of generation: a specific amount of solar, wind, baseline thermal power plants, flexible sources, and storage), and relies on technical analyses from the transmission system operator, RTE, including studies of future energy scenarios and assessments of how much capacity the system can safely absorb. If such analyses show that the grid or system adequacy cannot support the further expansion of a specific technology without additional reserves, storage, or grid investments, that limit becomes part of the planning and regulatory framework.
France, therefore, does not wait for a problem to appear during operation; it resolves it in advance through the plan. Consequently, a large project that significantly deviates from the directions established in the PPE practically cannot pass through the key phases of the administrative and regulatory approval process. Compliance with the PPE affects the issuance of permits, grid development plans, public tenders, and access to incentive mechanisms. In other words, the state defines the framework within which a project can be acceptable to the system in advance.
Particularly important is the principle the French framework introduces regarding the compatibility of lower-level acts with the state plan. This means that grid plans, regional connection plans, and the developmental pathways of generation capacities cannot be run separately from the national energy program. This avoids a situation where one part of the system moves in one direction while another goes in a completely different one. It is precisely this connection between strategy, permits, grid development, and regulatory decisions that gives the French model the strength of actual state control. This aspect in Serbia has been additionally strengthened by changes to the regulatory framework in recent years, but it requires improvements in the areas addressed by the remainder of this text.
It is very difficult, almost impossible, to build a significant generation facility that is not envisioned or at least aligned with the PPE, but there is a distinction between large projects and small private installations. In France, the threshold above which a project is directly conditional upon alignment with „PPE 3“ (the Ten-Year Energy Development Program) varies depending on the type of technology and the level of support the investor seeks. The threshold for rooftop solar power plants is 100 kW. If you plan a facility with a capacity greater than 500 kW, you are practically completely dependent on the PPE 3 quotas for financing, and if you exceed 10 MW, you become a direct participant in operationally maintaining the stability of the national grid under strict state supervision.
In the latest version of PPE 3 (2026–2035), adopted in February 2026, a significant pivot occurred in favor of nuclear energy, while targets for RES (renewable energy sources) were redefined to place a greater emphasis on sovereignty and system stability. Regarding the role of gas (presently only coal in our case) as a „standby capacity,“ PPE 3 explicitly defined that the remaining gas plants will not be shut down until nuclear stability is secured; instead, they will serve as a strategic reserve (below 5% of total generation) but must be ready to transition to hydrogen or biomethane. The essence of the change: PPE 3 shifted the focus from a simple „replacement of nuclear plants with renewables“ (which was the policy prior to 2022) to a „Nuclear Energy + RES“ strategy, where RES serves to cover growing consumption due to industrial electrification, while nuclear plants guarantee stability.
Prior State Verification of Alignment with National Needs and the Double-Key Mehanism in China
China implements this principle even more rigidly and in a procedurally starker manner. There, a project does not move toward construction simply because a general investment intent exists, but only after passing through a strict sequence of state and technical approvals. The Chinese model is therefore even more direct, demonstrating how vital prior state verification of alignment with national needs truly is. A project does not advance toward implementation until it is integrated into the state plan, or rather, if it is not aligned with the state plan.
At the foundation of the Chinese model lies a hierarchy between state planning institutions and the system operator, with the process operating as a double-key mechanism: state planners do not grant final approval without a positive opinion from the operator, and the operator does not initiate a serious technical procedure without prior preliminary state planning approval, through which the state signals whether the project in question is even needed.

(Diagram based on the architectural workflow of the Chinese double-key approval process)
An investor must first include the project in the state plan. The local DRC then issues a preliminary approval to begin preparatory works and draft studies (environmental, land). With this document, the project officially begins to exist, and only then does the investor approach the system operator, who only then opens the file and conducts the Grid Connection Study. This document DOES NOT allow construction until the system operator confirms the technical feasibility of the connection. Only when the state planning framework and the technical opinion of the operator come together can the project proceed further in the procedure. This system of dual control prevents power development from occurring outside the actual capacities of the grid and outside the long-term interests of the state.
The next step is the operator’s technical solution, meaning the definition of connection conditions. It is precisely during this phase that the operator determines the point on the grid where the project can connect, under what technical limitations, through what infrastructure, and—when it comes to wind and solar plants—with what additional obligations regarding energy storage. For new solar and wind projects, it frequently demands its own battery storage as a standard, so that the project is acceptable to the system from the standpoint of controllability and stability.
Only after obtaining the operator’s technical solution and other required opinions does the investor return to the state planner for final investment approval. Following this, they can enter the building permit phase and the actual commencement of works. The essence is clear: without integration into the state plan, there is no technical procedure, and without technical confirmation, there is no final state approval. This prevents grid and institutional resources from being wasted on projects that are not part of the planning framework or are not technically viable.
In both cases, the message is the same: the most successful systems do not rely on piecemeal decisions, but on a hierarchy of planning, clearly defined quotas, the alignment of individual projects with national needs and technology-specific quotas, technical verification, and state authority to direct development. This is precisely why the question of state control over the generation mix is not an expression of administrative rigidity, but a fundamental condition for energy security.
This is exactly why Serbia needs a binding energy development program as an operational instrument of state control. This document should not be a mere supplement to the strategy, but its executive core. Within it, quotas by technology, development priorities, conditions for projects entering implementation, limits of technical acceptability, and the dynamics ensuring a stable relationship between baseline, flexible, and variable generation must be precisely defined.
Without such a document, there is no actual control over the national generation mix. And without control over the national generation mix, there is no actual control over the power system. In that case, the state formally exists in the process but essentially does not manage it.
It is highly important to emphasize that state control in energy does not boil down to ownership alone, but primarily to planning, approval, alignment, and oversight. Energy security is maintained not merely because the state has institutions, but because those institutions possess authority, a hierarchy, and mechanisms of action. If there is no regulatory instrument connecting strategy with specific permits, connections, grid plans, and realization deadlines, then the system remains partially managed and certainly suboptimal in every respect.
The System Operator Must Be Part of the State Decision
The transmission system operator must hold a special place within such a framework. Its analyses of adequacy, operational security, balancing needs, and connection possibilities must not be a retrospective commentary on processes already underway. They must be an integral component of prior state decisions and binding plans and quotas by technology. Technical feasibility and alignment with the strategic plans of the state must precede administrative approval, not vice versa. Only in this way can power development be kept under real control.
Serbia must therefore also introduce a preliminary state verification mechanism for a project’s compliance with the national energy framework. Without such verification, further movement through key stages of the procedure should be impossible. Without this confirmation, a potential investor could not apply to any subsequent instance, nor advance to the preparation, study review, or realization phases of their project. By doing so, the state would clearly establish the principle that the power system is a unified national entity, rather than a collection of individual technical interventions fitted together after the fact.
Most importantly, the state must regain the capability to react to deviations from the planned mix. If it is determined that one type of capacity is developing faster than the projected level, while capacities that carry baseline security and system reserves are missing, the state must possess a clear instrument of correction. Without this, the plan does not manage development—development pushes the plan aside.
This is the crux of the matter: energy must not be an arena for passive administration, but for active state management. In a time of geostrategic uncertainties and the growing importance of electricity for industry, transport, digital infrastructure, and national defense, any relinquishment of full state control over the development of the generation mix represents an unnecessary risk.
The most successful systems in the world rest precisely on this principle. Not on improvisation, not on piecemeal decisions, not on retrospective alignment, but on a predefined state plan backed by technical analysis, institutional hierarchy, and enforcement mechanisms.
Conclusion: How Serbia Must Establish Its Energy Command Chain
The most successful power systems in the world do not rest on improvisation, piecemeal decisions, and retrospective alignment, but on a clear hierarchy of planning and state authority. For Serbia, it is of vital importance to step into this phase of institutional maturity and transform its energy strategy into a binding system of state control.
- Introduction of a Binding Development Program: Serbia urgently needs an energy development program as an operational instrument of executive power, in which quotas by technology, limits of technical acceptability, and the dynamics ensuring a stable relationship between baseline, flexible, and variable generation will be precisely defined.
- The System Operator as a Pillar of State Decisions: Adequacy, operational security, and balancing needs analyses produced by the transmission system operator must not be a retrospective commentary on already initiated processes. They must precede any administrative approval and be an integral part of binding state plans.
- Preliminary State Verification Mechanism: The state must establish a mechanism for preliminary confirmation of a project’s compliance with the national energy framework. Without this confirmation, a potential investor should not have the ability to approach any subsequent instance, nor enter the preparation and study review phases of the project.
- The Right to Correct Deviations: Most important of all is that the state regains the capacity for active reaction. If, for example, it is determined that variable capacities are developing faster than the projected level while capacities carrying baseline security and system reserves are lagging (such as our planned reversible hydroelectric plants or replacement baseline capacities), the state must hold a clear legal instrument to halt or correct that trend. The same applies to any other type or technology of generation.
Energy in the times we live in must not be a space for passive administration and market trend observation, but a space for active state dirigisme. Any relinquishment of full state control over the development of the generation mix represents a conscious exposure to unnecessary risk. Serbia must unite technical analysis, institutional hierarchy, and enforcement mechanisms.
Because in the end, a state that does not control the development of its generation mix does not fully control its own power system in the near future. And a state that lacks full control over its energy system can hardly speak of full sovereignty in a world that is becoming increasingly unstable, technically demanding, and geopolitically harsher.
